Correction of evident falsehood requires explicit negation by Weil, Rebecca. et al.
Accepted for publication in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 
Correction of Evident Falsehood Requires Explicit Negation 
Rebecca Weil, Yaacov Schul, & Ruth Mayo
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Author Note 
Rebecca Weil, The Martin Buber Society of Fellows, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
Yaacov Schul and Ruth Mayo, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. 
Rebecca Weil is now at the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Health Sciences, 
University of Hull, HU6 7RX, UK. 
This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF 594/12) and by a fellowship 
of The Martin Buber Society of Fellows, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, sponsored by 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Germany. The authors thank Noam 
Siegelman and Eric D. Gardiner for their help conducting the linear mixed-model analyses. 
The ideas and data presented in this article were previously presented at the Language and 
Social Cognition Conference (2015), Bern, Switzerland; the Third Conference on Cognition 
Research (2016), Israeli Society for Cognitive Psychology, Akko, Israel; the Cologne Social 
Cognition Meeting (2018), Germany; and at research talks at the University of Hull, UK. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rebecca Weil, 
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Hull, HU6 7RX, UK. 
Contact: r.weil@hull.ac.uk 
Wordcount: [15200]
©American Psychological Association, 2019. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the authoritative document 
published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: https://
doi.org/10.1037/xge0000635
Abstract 
The danger of receiving false information is omnipresent, and people might be highly vigilant 
against being influenced by falsehoods. Yet, as research on misinformation reveals, people are 
often biased by false information, even when they know the valid alternative. The question is 
why? The current research explores the relative encoding strength of two opposing 
alternatives involved in the correction of falsehood: the false concept and the valid concept. 
These encoding strengths may be critical for what people remember and how they act upon 
receiving false information. We compared two triggers for the correction of falsehood—a 
sentence consisting of clearly false information (e.g., “honey is made by butterflies”) and a 
sentence consisting of an explicit negation of this information (e.g., “honey is not made by 
butterflies”). The general pattern of results from five experiments demonstrates that the valid 
concept (e.g., “bees”) exhibits a weaker presence in memory than the false concept (e.g., 
“butterflies”) following the comprehension of evidently false information as compared to its 
explicit negation. Thus, the current research provides an answer to the riddle of the 
persistence of false information: False information is less likely to be mentally corrected if it 
is not explicitly negated. Even when people detect that a sentence is false, they tend to focus 
on the false concept rather than on the valid concept. These findings shed new light on extant 
research and offer fresh insights about the processing of false information and related 
phenomena such as the reliance on misinformation.  
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“The best way to get the right answer on the Internet is not to ask a question, it's to post 
the wrong answer.” The claim, denoted as Cunningham’s Law (McGeady, 2010; but see 
Cunningham, 2015), offers an optimistic view of the crisis of deceptive communication, 
suggesting that it is actually easier to arrive at a correct answer in response to a false sentence 
than in response to a question. In an age of online misinformation, in which fake news might 
spread faster and further than true information (Lazer et al., 2018), Cunningham’s Law 
appears outdated and the belief in its validity potentially dangerous, allowing for a 
dissemination of falsehoods. The zeitgeist is pessimistic, highlighting the fact that people do 
not cope well with falsehoods and often fail to correct false information (e.g., Fazio, Barber, 
Rajaram, Ornstein, & Marsh, 2013; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; 
Pantazi, Kissine, & Klein, 2018). The present research investigates the correction of false 
information by comparing two potential triggers for the correct answer—a clearly false 
sentence versus an explicit negation of falsehood. 
To illustrate, assume you are confronted with the sentence that “honey is made by 
butterflies.” Presumably, you noticed immediately with minimal effort that this sentence is 
false and rejected it. Do you just reject the false sentence or do you mentally correct the 
information by thinking of the valid concept “bees,” instead of the false concept “butterflies”? 
The present research tests this question in comparison to the outcomes of an explicit negation 
of false information as, for example, when you are told that “honey is not made by 
butterflies.” Here too, we ask whether people go beyond the negation and think of the valid 
concept “bees.” The two central questions of the present research are whether clearly false 
sentences and the negation of clearly false sentences allow, to the same degree, for the 
encoding of valid concepts and whether the two cases differ with respect to the encoding of 
false concepts. 
The encoding strength of the valid concept (e.g., bees) relative to the false concept (e.g., 
butterflies) that is present in the false communication, may be critical for how people act 
upon receiving false information and what they remember. The theoretical analysis of this 
issue entails integration of research on negation and validation into a larger theoretical 
framework. In doing so, we advocate a theoretical and methodological approach, attempting 
to highlight the challenges involved in handling false information. 
 
A Comparison of Falsehood and Negation 
 
Validation of False Information  
Validation is one of the cornerstones of meaning negotiation that occurs when 
recipients deal with incoming information. It is a by-product of the process of comprehension, 
generated upon receiving information (e.g., Richter 2015). In the case of obviously false 
sentences (e.g., “Honey is made by butterflies”), one recognizes that the sentence is false 
because it contradicts one’s existing knowledge (e.g., “Honey is made by bees”; see Kintsch 
& Van Dijk, 1978; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009; Singer, 
2013; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Because the danger of receiving false information is 
increasingly present in a culture that promulgates fake news (e.g., Hunt, 2016), people might 
be highly vigilant in detecting falsehoods (cf. Conroy, Rubin, & Chen, 2015). Indeed, the 
research on validation shows that people are proficient at detecting falsehood (Cook & 
O’Brien, 2014; Isberner & Richter, 2013, 2014; Richter et al., 2009).  
Yet, surprisingly, despite the findings attesting to the proficiency of validation 
processes, accumulating evidence indicates that people do in fact adopt false information 
even when they have existing knowledge that should have allowed them to reject it (for an 
overview, see Rapp & Braasch, 2014; see also earlier research on belief perseverance 
reviewed in Schul & Burnstein, 1998). This is commonly referred to as misinformation effect 
(e.g., Fazio et al., 2013; Singer 2019). At the most general level, the misinformation effect 
occurs when people are influenced by false information in spite knowing that it is false. 
However, the general term misinformation effect may mask the complexity of the 
phenomenon, and in fact, there might be important variations in the conditions that bring 
about susceptibility to false information (e.g., reliance on misinformation despite 
contradicting prior knowledge, continued influence of information that has been labeled as 
false, memory distortion of post-event misinformation; see also Ecker, Lewandowsky, 
Cheung, & Maybery, 2015). In the present manuscript we use the term reliance on 
misinformation to refer to biases caused by false information that contradict peoples’ prior 
knowledge. A typical finding is that even people who reveal factual knowledge in an early 
test (e.g., “The largest ocean is the Pacific”) err in answering the question “What is the largest 
ocean?” after being exposed to misinformation (e.g., “The largest ocean is the Atlantic”). The 
reliance on misinformation highlights the necessity of understanding the conditions under 
which validation takes place (for a meta-analysis on the efficacy of debunking 
misinformation, see Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; see also Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, & Cook, 2017) and how validation influences the encoding of the valid concept 
relative to the encoding of the presented false concept (Rapp, 2016; Singer & Doering, 2014). 
Hinze, Slaten, Horton, Jenkins, and Rapp (2014) proposed that the plausibility of the 
false concept in the given context influences the encoding when false sentences are 
processed. These authors reported that false yet plausible concepts (e.g., “The Pilgrims’ ship 
was the Godspeed”) were encoded more strongly than false and implausible concepts (e.g., 
“The Pilgrims’ ship was the Titanic”). The plausibility of the context is important as well.  
Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, and Horton (2014) showed that a realistic context led to a stronger 
encoding of false concepts as compared to an unrealistic context, suggesting that contextual 
information influences whether false or valid concepts should be prioritized. Indeed, Rapp 
(2008) demonstrated that even when participants were explicitly instructed to generate valid 
information prior to receiving false information, such instructions did not overcome the 
influence of a suspenseful context and did not substantially aid the validation process. 
Another factor that might affect the encoding strength of false relative to valid concepts 
is source credibility (Rapp, 2016). The assumption here is that people rely more on 
trustworthy sources and discount information from untrustworthy sources (see Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Hovland & Weiss, 1951, for early conceptualizations; Brinol & Petty, 
2009; Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013, for more recent discussions). Thus, comparing the 
valid and false concepts that are triggered by the same sentence, it could be assumed that 
valid concepts are encoded more strongly when false information is provided by 
untrustworthy sources, and false concepts are encoded more strongly when the false 
information is provided by trustworthy sources. Yet, Sparks and Rapp (2011) demonstrated 
that readers consider the credibility of a source only after they have comprehended 
information and evaluated its consistency with the active memory contents. Accordingly, 
source credibility might not influence the initial encoding of the information, but rather, 
encoding might be modified after validation is completed (see also Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 
2013). Finally, encoding of the valid concept when encountering false information appears to 
be particularly likely when recipients are primed to think of alternatives, as, for example, 
when they generate counter-information (e.g., Xu & Wyer, 2012) or they are in the mindset of 
distrust (Mayo, 2015; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004). 
Negation of False Information 
 In natural conversations, negations are as prevalent as words connoting positive 
emotions, twice as frequent as words connoting negative emotions, and almost three times 
more prevalent than words denoting causality (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). The 
dominant view is that processing negations is a complex task that demands cognitive 
resources (e.g., Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal, 2004) and often leads to memory failure 
(Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Horn, 1989; Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999; 
Just & Carpenter, 1976; Lea & Mulligan, 2002; see Mayo, 2015, for exceptions). Moreover, 
the use of negations entails higher syntactic and semantic complexity and hence involves the 
risk of misunderstanding compared to affirmative phrasings with the same meaning (Colston, 
1999; Fiedler, Walther, Armbruster, Fay, & Naumann, 1996; Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 
2004). So why do communicators choose to use a negation instead of an affirmative 
phrasing? 
Negations are attributed specific functions, such as mitigation and politeness (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987; Fraenkel & Schul, 2008), contradiction of expectations or beliefs, as done by 
denial or rejection (Clark & Clark, 1977; Givón, 1993; Horn, 1989), and the conveyance of 
understatement or irony (e.g., Giora, Balaban, Fein, & Alkabetz, 2005). Although affirmation 
and negation can often be used interchangeably (Giora, 2006; but see Beltrán, Orenes, & 
Santamaría, 2008), people sometimes prefer negation to ensure unambiguous communication, 
especially in the case of the rejection of a particular wrong message (Givón, 1978). To 
illustrate, although the vast majority of people would agree that honey is made by bees, the 
use of negation in the sentence “Honey is not made by butterflies” implies that someone 
assumed or stated that honey is made by butterflies. Accordingly, one of the functions of 
negation is highlighting falsehood. But does the negation induce mental correction? Do 
recipients encode the valid concept relative to the false concept more strongly when they are 
confronted with an explicit negation of falsehood? 
To the extent that negation lowers the activation level of a negated concept (de Vega et 
al., 2016; Kaup, 2001; Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007; MacDonald & Just, 1989; see also 
Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014), negation could be considered an effective counter-arguing 
linguistic tool in that it reduces thinking about the falsehood. However, often the opposite is 
found, and in actuality negations can lead to stronger encoding of false concepts compared to 
valid ones (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). 
Research shows that when valid concepts are not accessible or not available (see Mayo 
et al., 2004; Schul & Mayo, 2014), negation might backfire, leading to an encoding of false 
concepts (e.g., Adriaanse, van Oosten, de Ridder, de Wit, & Evers, 2011; Deutsch, 
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009; Kaup, 
Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003). However, when a false concept with a clear 
alternative concept is negated (e.g., Anderson, Huette, Matlock, & Spivey, 2010; Orenes, 
Beltrán, & Santamaría, 2014), negation might be encoded in line with the intended meaning 
of the negation (i.e., valid concept). 
In particular, the balance of encoding strength of valid relative to false concepts 
following negated falsehoods seems to be influenced by the pragmatic informativeness of the 
sentence and recipients’ expectations while they process it (Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland 
& Kuperberg, 2008; Nordmeyer & Frank, 2014). For example, embedding a negated sentence 
like “cars have no wings” in a context that makes the negation informative and expected (i.e., 
“Flying cars?! But cars have no wings”) might lead to a stronger encoding of valid concepts 
as compared to false concepts. Tian, Ferguson, and Breheny (2016) proposed that the 
pragmatic question that a recipient tries to answer when confronted with negation determines 
whether the recipient favors the false concept over its valid alternative. Finally, the balance 
between encoding strength of the valid and false concept may depend on personal 
affordances. Haran, Mor, and Mayo (2011) showed that chronically depressed individuals 
encoded negated affectively negative concepts more strongly than negated affectively 
positive ones, suggesting that accessibility of valid concepts might be determined by personal 
affordances. Importantly, as the above discussion suggests, the availability of a valid concept 
is a necessary condition for it to be encoded; however, this availability might not be 
sufficient. 
The Encoding of Affirmative False versus Negated True Information 
Several studies compared the processing and mental representation of affirmative and 
negated true and false information within one paradigm (e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972; Hasson 
& Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup et al., 2006; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). Consider first the 
comparison of affirmative true and affirmative false sentences. It has been found that the 
former has a processing advantage. To illustrate, assume participants are presented with 
sentences (e.g., “The star is above the plus sign”) and corresponding pictures, and they have 
to indicate whether the sentence correctly describes the picture. When the affirmative 
sentences match the content of the picture, the task is easier than when they mismatch. This 
reflects the relative ease with which one processes true information as compared to false 
information. Now consider the comparison of negated true and negated false sentences. In 
this case the latter has a processing advantage (but see Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; 
Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). Thus, for example, when the picture shows a star above a 
plus sign, it is easier for participants to detect falsehood for the negated false sentence “The 
star is not above the plus sign” than to verify the negated true sentence “The plus sign is not 
above the star.” Such findings are typically explained by the suggestion that people initially 
process the core of a sentence (e.g., star above plus sign), which is then negated. When the 
core is congruent with the picture it is easy to detect that a negated sentence is false. When 
the core is incongruent with the picture it becomes more difficult to see that a negated 
sentence is true (but see Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). However, after a short delay (i.e., 
1000–1500 ms; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup et al., 2006), the processing of negated 
true information does not differ from affirmative true information, indicating that the intended 
meaning of negation has been processed.  
Thus, it is likely that when people comprehend sentences involving a negation of false 
information, the false concept as well as the corresponding valid concept receive some level 
of activation. This might also be the case for affirmative sentences that convey false 
information (e.g., “honey is made by butterflies”). That is, when a false sentence is 
comprehended, the presented false concept (butterflies) is initially activated and subsequently 
integrated with other information in memory (Cook & O'Brien, 2014). This process might 
also involve activation of the valid concept (bees), and hence, it allows for a detection of 
falsehood by recognizing the mismatch between the false and the valid concept. Accordingly, 
the question of interest is whether comprehending a false sentence and an explicit negation of 
falsehood differs in its influence on the relative encoding strengths of false and valid concepts 
and thus affects how this information is remembered. 
 
The Present Study 
 
Our research investigates the encoding of valid (e.g., “bees”) and false (e.g., 
“butterflies”) concepts following false sentences phrased as affirmations (e.g., “honey is 
made by butterflies”) and their explicit negations (e.g., “honey is not made by butterflies”).  
For the sake of brevity, we sometimes refer to these sentences simply as false sentences and 
negated sentences. We use memory of valid and false concepts as a proxy for the encoding 
strength during comprehension. The influence of negated versus false sentences is assessed 
relative to a benchmark of baseline sentences (e.g., “Honey is made out of nectar”) that 
include information about the focal object (e.g., honey) without referring to the target concept 
(e.g., butterflies or bees). Therefore, the baseline sentences allow us to assess the general 
tendency to think about the target concepts given the focal object in a sentence.  
In none of the experiments do we ask participants to make any explicit truth evaluation; 
however, the experimental encoding tasks do differ regarding the relevance of truth-values. In 
Experiments 1a and 1b we investigate whether the encoding strength of valid and false 
concepts differs after false and negated sentences were processed within a grammatical task 
in which the truth-value of sentences is irrelevant for the task. In Experiments 2a and 2b we 
introduce an impression-formation task in which the truth-value of sentences has implications 
for the evaluation of sentences and sources. Experiment 3 separates the influence of the 
sources from the influence of sentences. Replicating the effect found in the earlier 
experiments, Experiment 3 demonstrates the importance of the evaluative component of 
sentences, independent of the sources. 
We collected the data of each experiment presented in the current manuscript in one 
shot without prior statistical analyses. Sample sizes were determined beforehand, and 
sensitivity analyses (GPower 3.1.9.2) assuming a power of (1-β) = .80 revealed that the 
experiments were sufficiently sensitive to detect effect sizes of ηp2 > .01, for the main 
statistical effects of interest. We report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all 
measures. Materials and data are available at https://osf.io/4xevs/. Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a, 
and 2b were approved by the ethics committee of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and 
Experiment 3 was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Hull. 
 
Experiment 1a 
 
Experiment 1a employed a task that required participants to process sentences to the 
degree that they could decide whether the sentences are presented in a correct grammatical 
order as opposed to being scrambled (i.e., a grammar task). We assumed that detecting a 
correct or incorrect grammatical order would require participants to read the full sentences 
but has little to do with the encoding of either false or valid concepts. The question of interest 
is whether upon processing negated or false sentences, would participants access and encode 
the corresponding valid concept? Importantly, we selected sentences for which the vast 
majority of our respondents’ population knows the correct answer (see Appendix for a list of 
all experimental sentences). Thus, we assumed that for all our sentences, the valid concept is 
potentially accessible.  
Experiment 1a tested whether the processing of negated and false sentences within a 
grammar task would lead to an encoding of valid concepts. In line with previous research, this 
should be the case for negated sentences (see Mayo et al., 2004; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 
2008) as well as false sentences (see Isberner & Richter, 2013, 2014; Richter et al., 2009). 
Thus, Experiment 1a investigates the hypothesis that processing of negated and false 
sentences leads to a stronger encoding of the valid concept compared to the baseline 
sentences.  
Participants and Design 
Because this is a new paradigm, we determined the sample size beforehand, with a total 
requirement of 250 participants. We recruited 250 participants (162 female, 85 male, 1 other, 
2 not reported; Mage = 36.85 years) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; e.g., Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). Participants could sign up for the 
experiment only if they resided in the United States. We required that they had previously 
completed at least 100 tests via MTurk and held a record of supplying acceptable data at least 
95% of the time. They received $1 for their participation. In a post-experimental demographic 
questionnaire, we asked about the participants’ native language, whether they were 
interrupted during the experiment or were in the presence of others while performing the task, 
and whether they had any educated guess concerning the purpose of the experiment.1 The 
experiment had a single-factor design with a three-level within-participant variation on the 
Sentence Type factor (affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline true).  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three consecutive phases: a grammar task, a filler task, and 
a memory-test phase. Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by 
Inquisit 4.0.6.0. In each trial of the grammar task, participants were presented with a sentence 
that appeared centered in the upper part of the screen. We instructed them to indicate whether 
the word order was jumbled, by pressing “q,” or correctly arranged, by pressing “p.” The 
sentence stayed on the screen until participants indicated their answer (see Figure 1). 
 
1 For exploratory reasons, the post-questionnaire of Experiment 1a contained a six-item dispositional trust 
questionnaire (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of trial of the grammar task in Experiments 1a and 1b. 
 
After the grammar task, participants were presented with a two-minute distraction task, 
which was modeled after the “Where’s Waldo?” series. Upon being shown a complex 
cartoon-like picture depicting a variety of people doing many different things, participants 
were asked to find a particular person (i.e., Waldo) in that picture. 
In the third and last phase of the experiment, participants took a surprise memory test 
for words presented in the grammar task. In each memory trial, participants were shown a 
probe word that appeared centered in the upper part of the screen. We instructed them to 
indicate on an 8-point scale (1 = new, 8 = old), which was superimposed below the probe 
word, whether they thought a probe appeared previously in the grammar task and was hence 
an “old” word, or whether they thought the probe did not appear before and was hence a 
“new” word. We explicitly told participants that their response should reflect their old/new 
categorization as well as their confidence in this categorization. Specifically, they were told: 
“If you think that the word is new and you are very sure about it, you should press 1; if you 
are somewhat sure, press 2 or 3; and if you are unsure, press 4. If you think that the word is 
old and you are very sure about it, you should press 8; if you are somewhat sure, press 6 or 7; 
and if you are unsure, press 5.” The instructions about how to use the scale were designed to 
make participants aware of the difference between thinking that a probe is old but being 
unsure (5) versus thinking that a probe is new but being unsure (4). To emphasize this 
distinction, labels were placed above the scale. The label “new” appeared on the left side of 
the scale (above the response options 1 and 2), and the label “old” appeared on the right side 
of the scale (above the response options 7 and 8). The center of the scale was labeled with 
“unsure” (placed centered between the response options 4 and 5), optically dividing the scale 
into response options associated with “new” responses (left side of the scale) and response 
options associated with “old” responses (right side of the scale) of different levels of 
confidence. 
Materials 
Stimuli (grammar task). Each participant saw 120 different sentences. Sixty of the 
120 sentences were shown in the experimental trials; the other 60 were fillers. The filler 
sentences were identical for all participants and were presented in a jumbled order (e.g., 
“Daffodils flowers are”). The experimental sentences were in Standard English. The 
experimental items were constructed in the following way: One member of the research team 
constructed a pool of clearly true sentences. Two other members of the research team selected 
from this pool the 60 most evidently true sentences, involving simple declarative facts (e.g., 
“Honey is made by bees”). These sentences were never shown in the experiment. Based on 
each true sentence, we created three variations: affirmative false sentences (e.g., “Honey is 
made by butterflies”), negated true sentences (e.g., “Honey is not made by butterflies”), and 
true baseline sentences (e.g., “Honey is made out of nectar”). Each participant saw only one 
of the versions, and we counterbalanced among participants the appearance of all three 
versions. Thus, participants saw 60 experimental sentences: 20 false, 20 negated, and 20 
baseline (see Appendix for sentences and counterbalancing conditions). The 60 filler trials 
aimed to eliminate the association between an affirmative/negated phrasing and the truth-
value of the sentence. To this end, the fillers consisted of 20 affirmative true sentences (e.g., 
“Daffodils flowers are”), 20 negated false sentences (e.g., “Barcelona in Spain is not”), and 
20 affirmative false sentences (e.g., “Strawberries thorns have”), all in a jumbled order, as 
mentioned above. Thus, combining the experimental and filler trials, each participant saw 40 
affirmative false, 40 affirmative true, 20 negated false, and 20 negated true sentences. Note 
that unlike the experimental sentences, each of which had three variations (false, negation, 
and baseline), the filler sentences had only one version each, and all participants saw exactly 
the same fillers.  
Stimuli (memory test). Participants viewed 120 different single-word memory probes, 
one for each sentence they saw during the grammar task. The memory probes for all the 
experimental items were “new.” That is, they were not presented in any of the sentences.  
Rather, they consisted of the word that appeared at the end of the original true sentence, 
which served as the basis for creating the three versions of the experimental items. To 
illustrate, assume the original sentence (not shown to participants) was “Honey is made by 
bees.” During the grammar task (i.e., in phase 1), each participant saw a false sentence (e.g., 
“Honey is made by butterflies”) or a negated sentence (e.g., “Honey is not made by 
butterflies”) or a baseline sentence (e.g., “Honey is made out of nectar”). All participants 
were shown the probe word “bee.” We tested whether recognition of the valid concept (e.g., 
“bees”) differs as a function of the type of sentence. The memory test rests on the assumption 
that stronger encoding causes a greater bias in memory, leading participants to indicate that 
the probe word was presented during the grammar task. 
In addition to the 60 experimental memory probes, we presented 40 memory probes 
consisting of words randomly taken from the filler trials, and 20 new words that had no direct 
relation to the sentences shown during the grammar task. Accordingly, the 40 words taken 
from the filler trials are considered “old” and the 20 words with no direct relation to the 
sentences “new.” All in all, participants saw 80 words that were not presented to them before 
(60 related to the experimental sentences and 20 completely new) and 40 old words. The 120 
words were presented in a randomized order. Each participant started the memory task with 
the same 10 additional filler probes (6 old words, 4 new words), resulting in a presentation of 
130 words in total. We did not include the 10 additional filler words in the analysis. 
Results 
We excluded non-native English speakers (n = 1), participants who reported being 
interrupted (n = 3) or in the presence of others while working on the experiment (n = 8), and 
participants who reported during the post-experimental questioning that in the memory test 
they were shown true alternatives to the false attributes they had seen previously (n = 11). We 
also excluded participants who exhibited incomplete data sets (n = 2). The following analysis 
is based on the remaining 225 participants. Including all participants in the analysis did not 
change the general pattern of results. 
Memory of unpresented valid concepts. All memory probes associated with the 
experimental items were “new.” The memory probes were expected to show a greater 
tendency to be confused as being seen previously (i.e., old) when the valid concept was 
accessed and processed during encoding. To assess whether the sentence type influenced the 
memory judgments of the unpresented valid concepts, we first conducted a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA on the factor Sentence Type (affirmative false vs. negated true vs. 
baseline). The responses on the 8-point memory scale served as the dependent variable. The 
analysis failed to support the hypothesis that the type of sentence matters in determining the 
judgments of memory of the valid concepts, F(2, 448) = 1.49, p = .23, ηp² = .01. The mean 
memory judgments of the valid concept following false sentences, negated sentences, and 
baseline sentences were close to each other (see Table 1).  
 
 
 
Table 1: Means of memory for probe words as a function of Sentence Type. Ratings were made on an 8-point 
scale (1 = new, 8 = old). Numbers in parentheses depict the standard error for the statistical analysis. 
Sentence type Memory probe 
valid concept 
(Experiment 1a) 
false concept 
(Experiment 1b) 
affirmative false 4.23 (.07) 5.44 (.07) 
negated true 4.29 (.07) 5.31 (.07) 
baseline 4.21 (.07)  
 
 
In addition, we compared the mean memory rating of the three types of target sentences 
(M = 4.24, SD = .94) to two benchmarks. First, these ratings were higher than the memory 
rating of “new” unrelated probes (M = 3.97, SD = 1.02), F(1, 224) = 48.18, p < .001, ηp² = 
.18, suggesting that the presence of the focal object in the sentence (e.g., “honey”) increased 
the feeling that the related probe word (e.g., “bees”) appeared in the original sentences. 
Second, these ratings were lower than ratings of “old” memory probes—those that refer to 
concepts actually presented in the sentences in the filler trials. These memory probes were 
judged as more “old” (M = 5.07, SD = .96) than were the valid concepts that had never been 
shown before, F(1, 224) = 189.82, p < .001, ηp² = .46.  
To corroborate our findings, we also conducted linear mixed-model analyses using the 
lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in the statistical software R Version 
3.4.1 for Windows (R Core Team, 2017). In the following we report the maximal random-
effect structures that converged (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). We fitted a model 
with Sentence Type (i.e., affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline) as fixed effect. The 
model had by-subject and by-item (i.e., nominal sentences used in the experiment; see 
Appendix) random intercepts, as well as by-item random slopes for Sentence Type. The 
analysis revealed a non-significant main effect of Sentence Type 2(2) = 3.78, p = .15. Model 
parameters and estimates for the model are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Model parameters and estimates for the model, Experiment 1a. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
intercept 4.24 0.10 43.51 4.05, 4.43 
affirmative false vs. baseline 0.02 0.05 0.37 -0.08, 0.12 
negated true vs. baseline 0.09 0.06 1.72 -0.01, 0.20 
 
 
Because we could not reject the possibility that all three types of sentences had the 
same memory outcomes, our results taken together do not provide conclusive evidence that 
the presence of negation, or falsehood, influenced the encoding strength of the valid concept. 
Performance in the grammar task. Might it be that the invariance in memory with 
respect to the sentence type reflects insensitivity to sentence type during encoding? In order 
to investigate whether participants were sensitive to the different sentence types, we 
performed a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. 
negated true vs. baseline), with the proportion of correct categorizations of sentences as 
“ordered” as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Sentence Type, F(2, 448) = 15.49, p < .001, ηp² = .07. To clarify this main effect, we 
computed contrasts comparing the different types of sentences to each other (see Table 3). 
These contrasts revealed that the rates of correct identification as “ordered” of true negated 
sentences and false affirmative sentences did not differ from each other, F(1, 224) = 1.34, p = 
.25, ηp² = .01. However, both types of sentences led to statistically inferior performance 
compared to the true baseline sentences: F(1, 224) = 24.44, p < .001, ηp² = .10 in the case of 
affirmative false; F(1, 224) = 22.88, p < .001, ηp² = .09 in the case of true negated. Thus, the 
falsehood of the sentences as well as the inclusion of negation seem to have somewhat 
interfered with the categorization task. 
All filler trials involved sentences in a jumbled word order. Analyses of the filler trials 
revealed that categorizing sentences as “jumbled” was also affected by Sentence Type, F(2, 
448) = 53.20, p < .001, ηp² = .19. Participants were most accurate for affirmative false 
sentences. Accuracy for these sentences was higher than for negated false sentences, F(1, 
224) = 52.86, p < .001, ηp² = .19, and for affirmative true sentences , F(1, 224) = 101.07, p < 
.001, ηp² = .31. Thus, the falsehood of the sentence seemed to help the correct categorization 
of a sentence as “jumbled,” with the exception being that negated false sentences were more 
difficult to categorize than affirmative false sentences, F(1, 224) = 52.86, p < .001, ηp² = .19.  
We are cautious in interpreting the accuracy outcomes of the fillers because unlike the 
experimental items, the type of filler sentence was confounded with the specific sentences 
that all participants saw. 
 
Table 3: Means of proportion of correct categorization of sentences as ordered/jumbled as a function of Sentence 
Type in Experiments 1a and 1b. Numbers in parentheses depict the standard error for the statistical analysis. 
Sentence Type Ordered Sentence Type Jumbled 
Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1a Experiment 1b 
affirmative false .94 (.01) .91 (.01) affirmative true .86 (.01) .84 (.01) 
negated true .95 (.01) .93 (.01) affirmative false .92 (.01) .90 (.01) 
baseline .97 (.01) .95 (.01) negated false .88 (.01) .86 (.01) 
 
Discussion 
The classification outcomes of the grammar task indicate a sentence-type effect: 
relative to the baseline, both negated sentences and false sentences interfered with detection 
of the sentences’ grammatical order. However, the memory results from Experiment 1a 
suggest that encoding within a grammar task causes little difference in the encoding strength 
of the valid concept among the three types of sentences: affirmative false, negated true, and 
baseline. Yet, compared to completely new concepts, the valid concepts were more likely to 
be confused as old, much in the same way as the related concepts presented in the baseline 
sentences.  
One may attribute our findings to the shallow levels of semantic processing that the 
grammar task induces as compared to, for instance, asking participants questions about the 
sentence content (see Isberner & Richter, 2014). Accordingly, deeper semantic processing, 
beyond detecting a correct grammatical order, might be necessary to influence the encoding 
strength of the valid concept while processing false sentences and their negations, relative to 
baseline sentences. Deeper semantic processing might be induced by a task that has direct 
relevance for the processing of sentences’ truth-values. We explore this possibility in 
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3. 
Although the results of Experiment 1a do not provide evidence for differences in the 
strength of encoding of the valid concept among false, negated, and baseline sentences, it is 
still possible that false and negated sentences differ with respect to the encoding strength of 
the false concept. Thus, Experiment 1b complements Experiment 1a by investigating the 
memory of the last word in the false and negated sentences, that is, the memory of the false 
concept. 
 
Experiment 1b 
 
Participants and Design 
In line with Experiment 1a, we determined the sample size beforehand, with a total 
requirement of 250 participants. Slightly larger samples resulted from participants who took 
part in the experiment but did not request their compensation immediately after completing 
the study. If these participants asked for their compensation later, we granted it retroactively. 
We recruited 254 participants (144 female, 108 male, 1 other, 1 not reported; Mage = 39.02 
years) via MTurk. We constrained participation to workers who did not take part in the first 
experiment. All other recruiting criteria, payment, and the demographic post-experimental 
questionnaire were identical to Experiment 1a. 
Procedure 
The experimental design was identical to Experiment 1a with the exception of the 
memory task. The experimental probe words in the memory task consisted of the presented 
false concepts (e.g., “butterflies”) that were shown in the affirmative false (e.g., “Honey is 
made by butterflies”) and negated true sentences (e.g., “Honey is not made by butterflies”) 
during the grammar task. The same probe word (e.g., “butterflies”) was also shown following 
the baseline sentences in the grammar task (e.g., “Honey is made out of nectar”). However, 
because the probe words did not appear in the baseline sentences and because they were not 
directly related to the baseline sentences semantically, they are considered new. The probes 
related to the filler trials were changed to reflect the changes in the experimental trials: 20 
probes related to affirmative false filler sentences (e.g., “Kids ‘trick or treat’ play on 
Christmas”) and were valid concepts (e.g., “Halloween”). The other 40 probes were new 
words with no direct relation to the sentences shown during the grammar task. 
Results 
We excluded all non-native English speakers (n = 5), participants who reported being 
interrupted (n = 8) or in the presence of others while working on the experiment (n = 10), and 
those who indicated they had help solving the task (n = 2). In addition, we excluded one 
participant who indicated having dyslexia, and one participant who asked to be removed from 
the data set. One participant had an incomplete data set and was removed. The following 
analyses are based on the remaining 234 participants. Including all participants in the 
analyses did not change the general pattern of results. 
Memory of presented false concepts. Both false and negated sentences were tested 
with the false concept, which was part of the sentence. Accordingly, an increasing tendency 
to rate the probe as “new” reflects a weaker encoding of the false concept. To assess whether 
the sentence type had an influence on the recognition of false concepts, we conducted a 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the factor Sentence Type (affirmative false vs. negated true). 
The responses on the 8-point memory scale served as the dependent variable. We omitted 
probes related to the baseline sentences from this analysis because the memory probe word 
was never presented in the baseline sentence (see Appendix). 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect for Sentence Type, F(1, 233) = 6.25, p = 
.01, ηp² = .03, indicating that participants judged the last word that was presented in the 
sentence as less old when the word had appeared in a negated sentence compared to when the 
word appeared in a false sentence (see Table 1). Categorization of concepts that were not 
shown in baseline sentences and should be considered as new (M = 3.89, SD = 1.16) differed 
significantly from affirmative false, F(1, 233) = 374.14, p < .001, ηp² = .62, and negated true 
sentences, F(1, 233) = 396.29, p < .001, ηp² = .63. 
As in Experiment 1a, we analyzed the data with a mixed-model design using R. 
Specifically, we fitted a model with Sentence Type (i.e., affirmative false vs. negated true) as 
fixed effect, by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as by-item and by-subject 
random slopes for Sentence Type. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Sentence 
Type, 2(1) = 7.67, p = .006. Model parameters and estimates are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Model parameters and estimates for the model, Experiment 1b. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
intercept 5.42 0.10 54.70 5.23, 5.62 
affirmative false vs. negated true -0.13 0.05 -2.84 -0.23, -0.04 
 
 
Performance in the grammar task. We performed a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the results (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline), with 
the proportion of correct classification of sentences as “ordered” as the dependent variable. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Sentence Type, F(2, 466) = 18.93, p < .001, 
ηp² = .08. To clarify this main effect, we conducted contrast analyses comparing each level of 
Sentence Type to the other levels (see Table 3). These analyses revealed that the rate of 
correct identification as “ordered” of negated sentences and false sentences differed from 
each other, F(1, 233) = 11.02, p = .001, ηp² = .05. That is, participants were more accurate in 
classifying negated true sentences than affirmative false sentences. As in Experiment 1a, both 
these sentences led to inferior performance compared to the baseline sentences: F(1, 233) = 
27.10, p < .001, ηp² = .10 in the case of affirmative false sentences; F(1, 233) = 13.87, p < 
.001, ηp² = .06 in the case of negated true sentences. 
Analyses of the filler trials revealed that categorizing sentences as “jumbled” was also 
affected by the Sentence Type, F(2, 466) = 39.71, p < .001, ηp² = .15. Participants were most 
accurate for affirmative false sentences. Accuracy for these sentences was higher than for 
negated false sentences, F(1, 233) = 24.94, p < .001, ηp² = .10, and for affirmative true 
sentences, F(1, 233) = 91.69, p < .001, ηp² = .28. Thus, the falsehood of the sentence seemed 
to help the correct categorization of a sentence as “jumbled,” with the exception being that 
negated false sentences were more difficult to categorize than affirmative false sentences, 
F(1, 233) = 24.94, p < .001, ηp² = .10. 
Combined analysis, Experiments 1a and 1b. Although the assignment of participants 
to the two experiments was not random, we performed a combined analysis of Experiments 
1a and 1b to examine whether the pattern of memory results for the valid and false concepts 
differs as a function of the type of sentence. A 2 (Memory Probe: valid unpresented concept 
vs. presented false concept) × 2 (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. negated true) mixed-
model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Memory Probe, F(1, 457) = 136.99, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .23, which was qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Sentence Type 
and Memory Probe, F(1, 457) = 7.33, p = .007, ηp2 = .02 (see Table 1). The pattern of means 
indicates that memory of false concepts is weaker after processing a negated sentence than 
after processing a false sentence, while there was a non-significant difference in the other 
direction for the memory of valid concepts. 
Discussion 
Summing up the results from Experiments 1a and 1b, we found that under conditions in 
which the processing task had little relevance for semantic encoding of information and might 
have induced rather shallow levels of processing, there was an interaction between the type of 
memory probe and the type of sentence. That is, although we found no evidence that the 
encoding of the valid concepts differed between the three types of sentences, the memories of 
false concepts presented in the sentences were influenced by the sentence type, even in a 
relatively impoverished encoding task. Specifically, the false concepts showed a weaker 
presence in memory after respondents processed negated sentences as compared to the 
processing of false sentences. We believe that this might be explained by the impact of the 
explicit negation, namely, through negation-induced inhibition (e.g., MacDonald & Just, 
1989). Based on Experiment 1b, we can infer that negation-induced inhibition might be 
triggered even when the task requires relatively shallow levels of semantic processing, and it 
occurs more strongly with explicit negations than after processing false sentences. 
There are several alternative explanations that could account for our findings. Although 
the classification outcomes of the grammar task suggested that both negated sentences and 
false sentences interfered with detection of the sentences’ grammatical order, we do not have 
direct evidence that respondents detected falsehood or processed the meaning of the negation. 
Experiments 2a and 2b address this.  
Moreover, the Sentence-Type-by-Memory-Probe interaction we observed could be an 
artifact of sentence length, because sentences that contained a negation were longer by one 
word compared to false sentences. To wit, for the memory of presented words, the longer the 
sentence the worse should be memory of what was presented. Accordingly, memory of the 
false concepts was worse following negated sentences than following false sentences. For the 
memory of valid concepts, such sentence-length effects should not hold. Our data are 
consistent with the suggestion of no difference among the three sentence types in the memory 
of the valid concepts. This might indicate that participants indeed did not process the full 
sentences. Experiments 2a and 2b are less amenable to these possibilities because they 
employ a task that requires more meaningful encoding of the stimulus information. We 
hypothesize that when the task induces more elaborative encoding, differences among 
negated true, affirmative false, and baseline sentences should be amplified, allowing us to 
rule out alternative explanations. 
 
Experiment 2a 
 
To induce more meaningful processing of information, we employed an impression-
formation task. Impression formation requires integration (Burnstein & Schul, 1982, 1983) 
and induces deep levels of encoding (Craik, 2002; Craik & Tulving, 1975). Briefly, when 
people form impressions they go beyond the information given in the communication and 
activate inferences to support the goals that the communication and context afford (Asch, 
1946; Heider, 1944; see relevant discussions in Wyer & Srull, 1986). To this end, in 
Experiments 2a and 2b, true and false sentences were paired with pictures of persons, and 
participants’ task was to form impressions of these persons while taking these sentences into 
account. 
In the context of impression formation, reception of falsehoods highlights to the 
recipients the truthfulness of the source and the danger of being misled. People expect sources 
of information to be truthful (Grice, 1975), and differentiating between sources that speak the 
truth and those that provide falsehoods helps confirm or disconfirm this expectation (Schul et 
al., 2004). A great deal of research shows that the trustworthiness of the source is of critical 
importance when people evaluate messages (e.g., Brinol & Petty, 2009; Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Smith et al., 2013; Sparks & Rapp, 2011), and 
that recipients’ attention to source-related information is influenced by the plausibility of the 
information the source provides (Braasch, Rouet, Vibert, & Britt, 2012). Therefore, when a 
source makes a blatantly false assertion (e.g., “honey is made by butterflies”), the concern 
with truth dictates that the recipient should pay attention to the false communication and 
consider it an indication about the source itself. This should result in two outcomes. First, the 
evaluation of sources in an impression-formation task should reflect whether falsehood or 
truth was detected. Specifically, sources associated with false sentences should be evaluated 
negatively, and those associated with true sentences should be viewed positively (see Hughes, 
Ye, Van Dessel, & De Houwer, 2018; Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011). Thus, 
the outcomes of the impression-formation task allow us to see whether falsehood has been 
detected. 
Second, sources’ trustworthiness should influence the encoding strength of false and 
valid concepts. When a source of information negates falsehood, he or she might be viewed 
as trustworthy. When recipients encounter trustworthy sources, they are less likely to be 
concerned with the exact phrasing of the communication or with the characteristics of the 
source. Rather, they become more concerned with clarity of the message (Sachs, 1974), 
tending to focus more on the gist of the information and less on the exact details. As a result, 
recipients of negated sentences may shift processing from the complex phrasing that includes 
the negation of the false concept to the simplified phrasing that includes the valid concept 
(Mayo et al., 2004). Accordingly, there should be a tendency to encode the negation in terms 
of the valid concept (see Fillenbaum, 1966) rather than the false concept. 
When the source of communication provides a false sentence, he or she becomes 
untrustworthy, and the relative encoding of false and valid concepts might be influenced in 
two opposite ways. First, to protect themselves from the danger of receiving false 
information, recipients may prioritize the encoding of valid concepts (see Schul et al., 2004). 
Alternatively, the danger of being misled might result in an encoding priority of false 
concepts because maintaining falsehood, rather than correcting falsehood, might help one 
remember that a source was untruthful, thus influencing their impression, and allowing 
recipients to protect themselves from the source in future communications (Hovland & Weiss, 
1951). 
Thus, Experiments 2a and 2b explored whether negated and false sentences differ with 
respect to the relative encoding strength of false and valid concepts when the truth-value of 
sentences has important implications for the task at hand. 
Participants and Design 
In line with our previous experiments, we determined the sample size beforehand, with 
a total requirement of 250 participants. Slightly larger samples resulted from participants who 
took part in the experiment but did not request their compensation immediately after 
completing the study. If these participants asked for their compensation later, we granted it 
retroactively. We recruited 256 participants (160 female, 96 male; Mage = 37.93 years) via 
MTurk. We constrained participation to workers who did not take part in the first two 
experiments. All other recruiting criteria, payment, and the demographic post-experimental 
questionnaire2 were identical to Experiments 1a and 1b. The experimental design was 
identical to Experiment 1a with the exception of the impression-formation task.   
Procedure 
The procedure and the stimulus material were identical to Experiment 1a, except for 
one critical difference. Sentences were presented as part of an impression-formation task in 
which we requested participants to form impressions of male persons. We instructed them as 
2 The post-experimental questionnaire in Experiment 2a had an additional question asking whether participants 
followed the instructions in the first part of the experiment by paying attention to both the presented sentence 
and the person presented together with the sentence. 
 
follows: “Research has shown that we form impressions about people easily, only based on 
their appearance. In our research we want to investigate how a statement made by a person 
can influence impression formation. Therefore, it is very important that you base your 
impression on both the picture and the statement.” In each trial, participants were first shown 
a sentence (that was true or false in an affirmative or negated phrasing). The sentence 
appeared centered in the upper part of the screen and was shown alone for 2000 ms. It was 
followed by a black-and-white photo of a male person, in side view, presented under the 
sentence in a centered position (see Figure 2). Black-and-white photos were taken from the 
Face Recognition Technology database (FERET; Phillips, Moon, Rizvi, & Rauss, 2000; 
Phillips, Wechsler, Huang, & Rauss, 1998). We asked participants to report their feeling 
toward the person, based on his picture and based on what he said. Participants pressed the 
“p” key on their keyboard to indicate they had an overall good feeling and pressed the “q” 
key to indicate an overall bad feeling. The sentence and the photo both stayed on the screen 
until participants indicated their answer.  
Each participant saw 120 different sentences, 60 of which were experimental trials. The 
filler sentences were identical to the filler sentences in Experiment 1a with the exception that 
they were shown in correct grammatical order. Each of the 120 sentences was paired with a 
different photo. All participants saw the same pairing of sentences and photos across 
conditions.  In particular, the same photo appeared irrespective of whether an experimental 
sentence was affirmative false, negated true, or baseline sentence. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of trial sequence of the impression-formation task in Experiments 2a and 2b. 
 
Results 
We excluded all non-native English speakers (n = 2), those who reported being 
interrupted (n = 5) or being in the presence of others while working on the experiment (n = 8), 
and those who realized that they were shown in the memory test true alternatives to the false 
attributes they had previously seen (n = 6). The following analysis is based on the remaining 
236 participants. Including all participants in the analysis did not change the general pattern 
of results. 
Memory of the unpresented valid concepts. We analyzed the memory scores in a 
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
Sentence Type, F(2, 470) = 3.70, p = .026, ηp² = .02 (see Table 5). Contrast analyses indicated 
that probes were rated as similarly old after participants processed false sentences and 
baseline sentences, F(1, 235) = .03, p = .86, ηp² = .00. Importantly, the memory probes that 
referred to the negated sentences were rated as more “old.” Specifically, after processing 
negations, participants rated probes as more old in comparison to the baseline, F(1, 235) = 
6.07, p = .01, ηp² = .03, and to the false sentences, F(1, 235) = 5.06, p = .025, ηp² = .02.  
Probe words that were taken from the filler trials (i.e., “old” probes) were rated as 
significantly more old (M = 5.86, SD = .83) than all other probe words (all p < .001). Memory 
ratings of probe words that were completely new, that is, probe words with no direct relation 
to any of the presented sentences, were significantly below the memory scores for the three 
types of experimental sentences (M = 3.85, SD = 1.11; all p < .001). 
 
Table 5: Means of memory for probe words as a function of Sentence Type. Ratings were provided on an 8-
point scale (1 = new, 8 = old). Numbers in parentheses depict the standard error for the statistical analysis. 
Sentence type Memory probe 
valid concept 
(Experiment 2a) 
false concept 
(Experiment 2b) 
affirmative false 4.09 (.07) 5.45 (.08) 
negated true 4.21 (.07) 5.18 (.07) 
baseline 4.08 (.07)  
 
 
We also analyzed the data with a mixed-model design using R. Specifically, we fitted a 
model with Sentence Type (i.e., affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline) as fixed effect 
and by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as by-item and by-subject random 
slopes for Sentence Type. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Sentence Type 
2(2) = 7.67, p = .02. Model parameters and estimates for the model are given in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Model parameters and estimates for the model, Experiment 2a. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
intercept 4.07 0.10 42.75 3.89, 4.26 
affirmative false vs. baseline 0.01 0.05 0.12 -0.09, 0.10 
negated true vs. baseline 0.13 0.05 2.51 0.03, 0.23 
 
 
Impression formation. The impressions in the experimental trials varied as a function 
of the variant of the sentence. For each person and each type of sentence (affirmative false vs. 
negated true vs. baseline), we computed the proportion of good feeling responses toward the 
person. We conducted a one-way ANOVA, with Sentence Type as a repeated-measures 
factor, on these proportions. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for Sentence 
Type, F(2, 470) = 536.39, p < .001, ηp² = .70 (see Figure 3). To clarify this main effect, we 
tested the pairwise contrasts comparing the levels of Sentence Type. These analyses revealed 
that false sentences (M = .24, SD = .23) led to fewer positive evaluations than negated true 
sentences (M = .71, SD = .21), F(1, 235) = 491.60, p < .001, ηp² = .68; and negated sentences 
led to fewer positive evaluations than baseline sentences (M = .80, SD = .20), F(1, 235) = 
73.38, p < .001, ηp² = .24. Thus, participants strongly disliked sources that provided false 
sentences and liked sources that used negated phrases somewhat less than sources that used 
affirmative phrases. This finding indicates that in forming their impressions, participants were 
sensitive to the type of sentence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean percentages of positive impression as a function of Sentence Type for Experiments 2a and 2b. 
Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
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Discussion 
The impression ratings differed for the three types of sentences. That is, false sentences 
triggered mostly negative impressions, and negated sentences elicited mostly positive 
impressions; however, the latter impressions were less positive than those resulting from the 
baseline sentences. The memory outcomes followed a different pattern: Negated sentences 
led to stronger encoding of the valid concept than did false sentences. In fact, we found no 
evidence that the valid concept was encoded any more strongly following the false sentences 
compared to baseline sentences. Experiment 2b complements Experiment 2a by investigating 
the encoding of the false concept that was shown within the sentence during the impression-
formation task.  
Experiment 2b 
 
Participants and Design 
In line with previous experiments, we determined the sample size beforehand, with a 
total requirement of 250 participants. Slightly larger samples resulted from participants who 
took part in the experiment but did not request their compensation immediately after 
completing the study. If these participants asked for their compensation later, we granted it 
retroactively. We recruited 267 participants (160 female, 100 male, 7 not reported; Mage = 
36.63 years) via MTurk. We constrained participation to workers who did not take part in the 
first three experiments. All recruiting criteria, payment, and the demographic post-
experimental questionnaire3 were identical to the previous experiments. The experimental 
3 The post-experimental questionnaire in Experiment 2b had an additional question asking whether participants 
followed the instructions in the first part of the experiment by paying attention to both the presented sentence 
and the person presented together with the sentence. The post-questionnaire also contained a six-item 
dispositional trust questionnaire (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
 
design was identical to Experiment 2a with the exception of the memory test. The memory 
test in Experiment 2b was identical to the memory test in Experiment 1b. 
Results 
We excluded all non-native English speakers (n = 2), those who reported being 
interrupted (n = 3) or being in the presence of others while working on the experiment (n = 9), 
and one participant who indicated in the post-experimental questionnaire, apparently due to 
the filler trials, that he/she was shown true alternatives to the false attributes viewed 
previously. In addition, we excluded participants who exhibited incomplete data sets (n = 7). 
The following analyses are based on the remaining 245 participants. Including all participants 
in the analyses did not change the general pattern of results. 
Memory of presented false concepts. We conducted a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the factor Sentence Type (affirmative false vs. negated true). The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for Sentence Type, F(1, 244) = 19.94, p < .001, ηp² = .08 
(see Table 4). Replicating the results of Experiment 1b, participants rated a word that actually 
appeared in the sentences of the impression-formation phase as less old when it appeared in a 
negated sentence than when it appeared in a false sentence. Recognition of concepts that were 
not shown in baseline sentences and should be considered as new (M = 3.67, SD = 1.31) 
differed significantly from affirmative false, F(1, 244) = 389.53, p < .001, ηp² = .62, and 
negated true sentences, F(1, 244) = 338.94, p < .001, ηp² = .58. 
We also performed a mixed-model analysis, with Sentence Type (i.e., affirmative false 
vs. negated true) as fixed effect and by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as by-
item and by-subject random slopes for Sentence Type. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Sentence Type, 2(1) = 18.63, p < .001. Model parameters and estimates for 
the model are given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Model parameters and estimates for the model, Experiment 2b. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
intercept 5.42 0.12 46.18 5.19, 5.65 
affirmative false vs. negated true -0.25 0.06 -4.60 -0.36, -0.14 
 
 
Impression formation. The impression-formation results were virtually identical to 
those in Experiment 2a (Figure 3). To assess whether the sentence type had an influence on 
impression formation, we conducted a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on the factor 
Sentence Type (affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline). We found a significant main 
effect for Sentence Type, F(2, 488) = 472.03, p < .001, ηp² = .66. To clarify this main effect, 
we computed contrasts comparing each level of Sentence Type. These revealed that 
affirmative false sentences (M = .25, SD = .24) led to fewer positive impressions than negated 
true sentences did (M = .69, SD = .22), F(1, 244) = 418.88, p < .001, ηp² = .63, and negated 
true sentences led to fewer positive impressions than (true) baseline sentences did (M = .80, 
SD = .20), F(1, 244) = 91.01, p < .001, ηp² = .27, thus reinforcing the claim that in forming 
their impressions, participants were sensitive to the type of sentence. 
Combined analysis, Experiments 2a and 2b. In spite of the non-random assignment 
of participants to experiments, we compared the memory outcome in the two experiments 
using a 2 (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. negated true) × 2 (Memory Probe: valid 
alternative vs. false presented) mixed-model ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Memory Probe, F(1, 479) = 144.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, which was qualified by 
a significant two-way interaction of Sentence Type and Memory Probe, F(1, 479) = 23.58, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .05 (see Table 5).  The interaction pattern indicates that memory for false 
concepts was weaker after processing negated true sentences than after processing affirmative 
false sentences, while memory for valid concepts was stronger after negated true sentences 
than after affirmative false sentences. 
Discussion 
Summing up the results from Experiments 2a and 2b, we found that the positivity of the 
impression formation was influenced by the type of sentence. Sources who were associated 
with false sentences were evaluated less favorably than sources who were associated with true 
sentences. Thus, we can assume that falsehoods were detected and negations were processed. 
The memory data showed that false and negated sentences differed with respect to the 
strength of encoding of valid and false concepts when they were encoded within an 
impression-formation task. In particular, negated sentences were associated with stronger 
encoding of the valid concept and weaker encoding of the false concept relative to false 
sentences. The results rule out the possibility that sentence length is an alternative explanation 
for our findings, because valid concepts led to stronger encoding for negated sentences as 
compared to false sentences and baseline sentences. This can only occur when the full 
sentences, containing negations, are processed. The pattern of results is consistent with the 
hypothesis that forming an impression about untruthful sources leads to an encoding priority 
of false concepts, while forming an impression of truthful sources leads to an encoding 
priority of valid concepts.  
Experiment 3 attempts a more fine-grained analysis of the impression-formation task. 
Our operationalization of impression formation involved two components—the presence of a 
source and an explicit evaluation task. Participants were asked to report their feeling toward 
sources, taking sentences that sources made into account. Experiment 3 investigates whether 
we can attribute the effects found in Experiments 2a and 2b to the presence of the source or to 
the evaluation task itself. To this end, half of the participants in Experiment 3 evaluated 
sources and their statements on a good–bad dimension (as in Experiments 2a and 2b), and the 
other half evaluated only the statements on a good–bad dimension. 
Experiment 3 addresses a methodological limitation of the previous experiments as 
well. In Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, participants rated the experimental sentences with 
respect to either the memory of the valid unpresented concept (1a, 2a) or the memory of the 
presented false concept (1b, 2b), making the memory probe a factor that varied between 
experiments. However, as suggested by the combined analyses, our main argument is 
informed by the interaction between valid and false concepts as a function of Sentence Type. 
Thus, Experiment 3 manipulated the factor Memory Probe within-participant. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Participants and Design 
In line with previous experiments and to account for an additional between-subjects 
factor, we determined the sample size beforehand, with a total requirement of 500 
participants. Slightly larger samples resulted from participants who took part in the 
experiment but did not request their compensation immediately after completing the study. If 
these participants asked for their compensation later, we granted it retroactively. We recruited 
519 participants (271 female, 229 male, 6 other, 13 unknown; Mage = 34.40 years) via Prolific 
Academic (e.g., Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). Participants could sign up for 
the experiment only if they were United States nationals, currently residing in the United 
States, and if they were native English speakers. We required that they held a record of 
supplying acceptable data at least 90% of the time. They received £1.67 (approx. $1.30) for 
their participation. The post-experimental demographic questionnaire was identical to the 
previous experiments. Data collection was interrupted once due to technical issues. 
The study consisted of a 3 (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. negated true vs. 
baseline true) × 2 (Memory Probe: old vs. new alternative) × 2 (Task: person impression vs. 
sentence impression) mixed-model design, with the first two factors being manipulated 
within-participant and the third being a between-participants factor. 
Procedure 
Similar to Experiments 2a and 2b, Experiment 3 consisted of three consecutive phases: 
an impression-formation phase, a filler task, and a memory-test phase. The person-impression 
condition was identical to the impression-formation phase in Experiments 2a and 2b. In the 
sentence-impression condition, participants were presented only with a sentence and were 
instructed to indicate whether they have an overall good or bad feeling toward the presented 
sentence. The instructions were as follows: “First you will be presented with a statement. 
Please read this statement carefully. Then you will be asked to indicate your overall feeling 
toward the statement. Please indicate whether you have an overall good or bad feeling toward 
the statement.” The sentence appeared centered in the upper part of the screen and was shown 
for 2000 ms. We asked participants to report their feeling toward the sentence by pressing the 
“p” key on their keyboard to indicate they had an overall good feeling, and pressing the “q” 
key to indicate an overall bad feeling. Participants’ responses were recorded only after 2000 
ms. The sentence stayed on the screen until participants indicated their answer. The 
subsequent filler task was identical to that of the previous experiments.  
The type of memory probe in the memory-test phase was manipulated within-
participant. Specifically, each participant was presented with 90 experimental memory-probe 
words (plus 10 fillers). The probe words included 10 valid concepts (i.e., “new” memory 
probes, not presented in the sentences) for negated sentences and 10 valid concepts for false 
sentences, as well as 10 false concepts (i.e., “old” memory probes, presented within the 
sentences) for negated sentences and 10 false concepts for false sentences. Memory of probes 
from 20 baseline sentences was also tested with the valid or the false concept. However, 
because valid and false concepts were not included in the baseline sentences, all 20 memory 
probes relevant to the baseline sentences are considered new. Finally, we included 30 
memory probes that were completely new, namely, unrelated to any of the sentences. We 
counterbalanced (between-participants) which nominal sentences served as reference for the 
old or new memory probes. This resulted in four different counterbalancing conditions. 
Each participant started the memory task with the same 10 filler probes (6 old words, 4 
new words), which were not included in the analysis. In contrast to the previously reported 
experiments, there were no additional fillers. Accordingly, each participant saw a total of 100 
memory probes during the memory-test phase. 
Results 
We excluded all non-native English speakers (n = 8), participants who reported being 
interrupted (n = 7) or in the presence of others while working on the experiment (n = 17), 
those who indicated they had help solving the task (n = 1) or wrote down the key assignment 
instead of memorizing it (n = 13), and those who indicated in the post-experimental 
questionnaire that during the memory test they were shown true alternatives to the false 
attributes they had previously seen (n = 11). In addition, we excluded one participant who 
indicated that he or she confused the keys in most parts of the experiment, and one participant 
who indicated strongly disliking the experiment. Data sets of 17 participants were incomplete 
and were removed. Accordingly, the following analyses are based on the remaining 448 
participants. Including all participants in the analyses did not change the general pattern of 
results. 
Memory of false and valid concepts. We start by comparing the memory judgments 
for the valid and false concepts. The memory scores were analyzed in a 2 (Sentence Type: 
affirmative false vs. negated true) × 2 (Memory Probe: valid alternative vs. false presented) × 
2 (Task: person impression vs. sentence impression) mixed-model ANOVA. Memory ratings 
of probes related to the baseline sentences were omitted from this analysis. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect for Memory Probe, F(1, 446) = 644.18, 
p < .001, ηp² = .59, which was qualified by a significant interaction of Memory Probe and 
Sentence Type, F(1, 446) = 23.02, p < .001, ηp² = .05 (see Table 8). To clarify this interaction, 
we compared the two types of sentences for valid-concept and false-concept memory probes. 
The valid-concept probes were judged as older after negated sentences (M = 4.06, SD = 1.36) 
than after false sentences (M = 3.94, SD = 1.37), F(1, 447) = 6.26, p = .01, ηp² = .01, 
suggesting that the valid concepts were encoded more strongly after negated true sentences 
than after affirmative false sentences. The false concepts were rated as less old when they 
were embedded in negated sentences (M = 5.33, SD = 1.22) than when they appeared in false 
sentences (M = 5.55, SD = 1.14), F(1, 447) = 14.77, p < .001, ηp² = .03, suggesting that the 
false concepts were encoded less strongly after negated true sentences than after affirmative 
false sentences. Thus, Experiment 3 replicates the pattern of findings observed in 
Experiments 2a and 2b. The three-way interaction of Memory Probe, Sentence Type, and 
Task was not significant, F(1, 446) = 2.74, p = .10, ηp² = .01, a finding consistent with the 
observation that the 2 (Sentence Type) × 2 (Memory Probe) interaction pattern is not very 
different in the sentence-impression and the person-impression conditions. Thus, we did not 
find evidence for the importance of the source of information for the pattern of memory of the 
valid and false concepts. That is, the evaluation task itself rather than the presence of a source 
seems to be critical for the obtained effects. 
Notwithstanding, the analysis revealed that the presence (vs. absence) of a source led to 
a significant main effect for Task, F(1, 446) = 5.94, p = .02, ηp² = .01, which was qualified by 
a significant interaction of Task and Memory Probe, F(1, 446) = 18.46, p < .001, ηp² = .04. 
The pattern of these findings indicates that, overall, valid concepts were encoded more 
strongly in the person-impression condition (M = 4.22, SD = 1.22) as compared to the 
sentence-impression condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.26), while there was virtually no difference 
in the memory of the false concept (M = 5.43, SD = 1.05 vs. M = 5.46, SD = .97). We can 
only speculate that this pattern occurs because sources served as additional information that 
needed to be processed and integrated with the sentence information. As a result, they made it 
easier to distinguish between actually presented and new information in the sentence-
impression condition. 
Our next analysis focuses on the valid concepts. It tests whether negated and false 
sentences lead to an increase in encoding of valid concepts relative to baseline level. To this 
end, the memory judgments of the valid concepts were analyzed in a 3 (Sentence Type: 
affirmative false vs. negated true vs. baseline) × 2 (Task: person impression vs. sentence 
impression) mixed-model ANOVA. The analysis revealed a non-significant two-way 
interaction of Sentence Type and Task, F(2, 892) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp² = .00, suggesting that we 
do not have evidence supporting a Sentence Type difference between the person-impression 
and the sentence-impression tasks. Accordingly, it is meaningful to examine the main effect 
of Sentence Type, F(2, 892) = 6.61, p = .001, ηp² = .02 (see Table 8). Contrast analyses 
showed that, as in Experiment 2a, probes’ memory reports were similar after participants 
processed false sentences (M = 3.94, SD = 1.37) and baseline sentences (M = 3.89, SD = 
1.34), F(1, 447) = .96, p = .33, ηp² = .00. However, the memory probes that corresponded to 
the negated sentences (M = 4.06, SD = 1.36) were rated as older than the probes 
corresponding to the two other sentence types. Specifically, following negated sentences, 
participants rated probes as older compared to the baseline, F(1, 447) = 11.46, p = .001, ηp² = 
.03, and to the false sentences, F(1, 447) = 6.26, p = .013, ηp² = .01. 
Finally, memory ratings of probe words that were completely new—that is, probe 
words with no direct relation to any of the presented sentences—were significantly below the 
memory scores for the three types of experimental sentences (M = 3.20, SD = 1.21; all p < 
.001). 
 
 
Table 8: Means of memory for probe words as a function of Sentence Type and Task for Experiment 3. Ratings 
were made on an 8-point scale (1 = new, 8 = old). Numbers in parentheses depict the standard error for the 
statistical analysis. 
Sentence type Memory probe 
Person impression Sentence impression 
valid concept false concept valid concept false concept 
affirmative false 4.19 (.09) 5.52 (.08) 3.65 (.09) 5.59 (.08) 
negated true 4.25 (.09) 5.34 (.08) 3.85 (.09) 5.32 (.09) 
baseline 4.08 (.09)  3.67 (.09)  
 
 
We used a mixed-model analysis to fit a model with Sentence Type (i.e., affirmative 
false vs. negated true), Memory Probe (i.e., valid vs. false), and Task (i.e., person impression 
vs. sentence impression) as fixed effects. The model had by-subject and by-item random 
intercepts, as well as by-item and by-subject random slopes for Sentence Type. The analysis 
revealed a significant interaction of Memory Probe and Sentence Type, 2(1) = 26.67, p < 
.001, and a non-significant interaction of Memory Probe, Sentence Type, and Task, 2(1) = 
2.05, p = .15. Model parameters and estimates for the model omitting the three-way 
interaction but including all two-way interactions are given in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Model parameters and estimates for the model, Experiment 3. 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-value 95% Confidence 
Interval  
Intercept 4.62 0.16 28.17 4.30, 4.94 
Sentence Type 0.10 0.12 0.81 -0.13, 0.33 
Memory Probe 0.90 0.11 8.24 0.69, 1.12 
Task -0.47 0.10 -4.83 -0.66, -0.28 
Sentence Type × Memory Probe -0.35 0.07 -5.17 -0.48, -0.22 
Sentence Type × Task 0.01 0.07 0.17 -0.13, 0.15 
Memory Probe × Task 0.49 0.07 7.31 0.36, 0.62 
 
The impression-formation tasks. A 3 (Sentence Type: affirmative false vs. negated 
true vs. baseline true) × 2 (Task: person impression vs. sentence impression) mixed-model 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Task, F(1, 446) = 18.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, 
and a significant main effect of Sentence Type, F(2, 892) = 1876.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .81, 
qualified by a significant interaction of Task and Sentence Type, F(2, 892) = 67.53, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .13. To clarify this interaction, we computed the simple effects contrasts comparing 
each level of Sentence Type within the person-impression condition and the sentence-
impression condition. As can be seen in Figure 4, the three types of sentence differ from each 
other within each of the two tasks, but the impressions were more extreme in the sentence-
impression condition.   
Specifically, in the person-impression condition, persons were evaluated more 
favorably when they were shown with a negated true sentence (M = .69, SD = .21) than when 
they were shown with an affirmative false sentence (M = .22, SD = .22), F(1, 239) = 526.17, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .69. Moreover, persons were evaluated more favorably when they were shown 
with a true baseline sentence (M = .77, SD = .21) than when they were shown with a negated 
true sentence, F(1, 239) = 58.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, or with an affirmative false sentence, 
F(1, 239) = 598.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .72.  
The sentence-impression condition showed a similar yet stronger pattern of effects, as 
revealed by the abovementioned interaction. Sentences were evaluated more favorably when 
they were negated true sentences (M = .79, SD = .17) than when they were affirmative false 
sentences (M = .11, SD = .14), F(1, 207) = 1438.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. Moreover, sentences 
were evaluated more favorably when they were true baseline sentences (M = .92, SD = .08) 
than when they were negated true sentences, F(1, 207) = 148.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, or when 
they were affirmative false sentences, F(1, 207) = 4125.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .95. This suggests 
that participants were sensitive to the type of sentence as well as the presence of the source, 
and it appears that the information about the source (i.e., the picture of that person) diluted the 
sentence effect. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean percentages of positive impression as a function of Sentence Type for Experiment 3. Error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Combined Analysis of the Effects of the Three Encoding Tasks  
Because the Sentence Type × Memory Probe interaction was significant in all three 
processing tasks—namely grammar, person impression, and sentence impression—we 
examined statistically whether our findings imply that the three tasks influence the Sentence 
Type × Memory Probe interaction differently. To do so, we combined the data from all five 
experiments (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), with the question of interest being whether the task 
interacted with the pattern of findings reported in the different experiments. To anticipate the 
conclusion, we do not have statistical evidence to support the claim that the two-way 
interaction between Sentence Type and Memory Probe differs as a function of the processing 
task.  
Specifically, our analyses focused on two interactions: the two-way interaction of 
Sentence Type (affirmative false vs. negated true) and Memory Probe (valid concept vs. false 
concept), and the three-way interaction of Sentence Type, Memory Probe, and Experiment 
(1a/b, 2a/b, 3). The two-way interaction compares the encoding of the false and valid 
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concepts for negated true and affirmative false sentences in all reported experiments. The 
three-way interaction examines whether the effect differs for the three separate experiments.  
In order to examine the former, we fitted a model including the two-way interaction of 
Sentence Type and Memory Probe as fixed effect, controlling for all main effects. The model 
featured by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as a by-subject and by-item 
random slope for Memory Probe. The analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction of 
Sentence Type and Memory Probe, 2(1) = 61.02, p < .001, indicating that averaging over the 
processing tasks, encoding strength of valid concepts was more pronounced for negated true 
sentences as compared to affirmative false sentences, and encoding strength of false concepts 
was less pronounced for negated true sentences as compared to affirmative false sentences.  
Next, we tested whether this two-way interaction differs for the three tasks. In order to 
investigate this question, we fitted a model including the three-way interaction of Sentence 
Type (affirmative false vs. negated true), Memory Probe (valid concept vs. false concept), 
and Experiment (1a/b, 2a/b, 3) as fixed effect, while controlling for all two-way interactions 
and main effects. The model had by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as a by-
subject and by-item random slope for Memory Probe. The analysis revealed a non-significant 
three-way interaction of Sentence Type, Memory Probe, and Experiment, 2(1) = 2.74, p = 
.09.  
Thus, taken together, the statistical analyses provide strong evidence that the memory of 
the valid and false concepts differs as a function of the type of sentence. Moreover, our 
findings fail to reveal strong evidence that the type of encoding matters for this interaction. 
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that across the three tasks, which are very 
different from each other, the valid concept is triggered more strongly by negated sentences 
than by false sentences; and at the same time, the false concept is more strongly triggered by 
false sentences than by negated sentences. This could be taken as a testimony for the 
enhanced encoding of the false information, which is consistent with the literature on reliance 
on misinformation and belief perseverance (e.g., Rapp & Braasch, 2014; Schul & Burnstein, 
1998), demonstrating that people tend to be influenced by false information even when they 
know this information is false. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The danger of receiving false information is omnipresent, and people might be highly 
vigilant against being influenced by falsehoods. Yet, as research on misinformation reveals, 
people are often biased by false information, even when they know the correct answer. The 
question is why? Our research provides an answer to this riddle: Even when people reject a 
sentence as false, they tend to focus on the false concept rather than on the valid concept.  
But, in order to mentally correct a false sentence, recipients need to consider the valid answer.  
When we compared two triggers for the correction of falsehood—a sentence consisting of 
clearly false information and a sentence consisting of an explicit negation of this 
information—we found that the valid concept exhibits a weaker presence in memory, and the 
false concept a stronger presence in memory, following the comprehension of false 
information as compared to its negation. In short, although evidently false, these sentences 
bias memory away from the truth.  
Experiment 1a investigated the encoding of the valid concept, within a grammar task 
that was irrelevant to the sentences’ truth-value and might have induced rather shallow 
processing levels. The statistical analysis failed to support encoding differences of valid 
concepts between negated and false information, leading us to investigate tasks that require 
more meaningful processing (e.g., Isberner & Richter, 2014; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). 
Notwithstanding, Experiment 1b demonstrates that even such shallow processing was 
sufficient to reduce the strength of encoding of the negated concept, in line with predictions 
of negation-induced-inhibition models (e.g., de Vega et al., 2016; Kaup, 2001; MacDonald & 
Just, 1989). Together, this pattern suggests that a negation of falsehood is less likely to result 
in an encoding of false concepts than obvious false information, even when elaborative 
encoding is minimal.  
Experiments 2a and 2b tested whether the pattern of encoding of the valid and the false 
concepts varies when processing is more meaningful and takes place within an impression-
formation task in which the truth-value of sentences is of importance. We found that more 
meaningful processing induced more pronounced encoding effects. Specifically, negated 
falsehoods were associated with an enhanced encoding of the valid concept and a weaker 
encoding of the false concept as compared to obvious false sentences. Experiment 3 
investigated whether the presence of a source is critical for this pattern of encoding effects. 
The findings suggest that the evaluation task is responsible for the abovementioned effects. 
Why Are Falsehoods Not Corrected Unless They Are Explicitly Negated? 
The difference between negated and false messages with respect to the encoding of 
false and valid concepts might be explained by the pragmatic implications attributed to 
negation. Explicit negation might be interpreted as a “refute” cue, previously addressed in 
persuasion research (e.g., Schul & Mazursky, 1990), leading recipients to inhibit the false 
concept and encode the valid concept. For reasons discussed below, false information might 
not trigger such a “refute” response, and so the difference between false information and 
negated information might have to do with the operation triggered by explicit negation. In 
line with this interpretation are the findings from Rapp and Kendeou (2007) showing that 
refutation is more likely to occur when people are explicitly instructed to revise their existing 
knowledge. In this sense, explicit negation might function as an instruction to update 
knowledge and encode the valid concept. This reasoning is consistent with the Knowledge 
Revision Components (KReC) Model (Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014) that suggests that 
knowledge might be revised and updated when a reason (e.g., causal explanation) is provided 
why mental correction might be necessary (see also Rapp & Kendeou, 2009). Accordingly, 
without any reasons to refute false information, false concepts may be more strongly encoded 
than valid concepts. 
A complementary conceptualization attributes the difference between negated and false 
sentences to the kind of mental model that falsehood implies. Specifically, unlike negation, 
false information might not necessarily involve the construction of a mental model of a valid 
concept even when falsehood is detected (see Isberner & Richter, 2013, 2014; Reder, 1982; 
Richter, 2015; Richter et al., 2009). To illustrate, the sentence “soap is edible” can be rejected 
on the basis of general world knowledge (e.g., that soap does not belong to the category of 
food) rather than by activating a specific valid alternative (see also Hagoort, Hald, 
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). This might be the case even for 
sentences with a clear valid alternative available. For example, “a pear is a vegetable” might 
be rejected on the basis of knowledge that a pear does not belong to the category of 
vegetables. Accordingly, such rejections would not lead to an encoding of valid concepts. It is 
important to note that the pragmatic implications attributed to negation and the mental model 
implied by falsehood are not contradictory, and each may contribute to the tendency to 
prioritize the false concept and neglect the valid concept when being confronted with a false 
assertion. 
We noted earlier that the pragmatic implications of falsehood might require recipients 
to keep it in mind because such memory can be beneficial in the future. That is, it pays to 
remember false information in the present, either because it facilitates the construction of 
counter-arguments that can be used in the future (e.g., the Inoculation Model; McGuire, 1964) 
or because it helps to identify untrustworthy sources of information so that their messages can 
be later discounted (Tormala & Clarkson, 2008). Yet, it could be argued that a focus on the 
valid concept serves as a better means of self-protection. However, to counter the salience of 
a presented false concept, one has to activate a strong cognitive procedure that allows 
inhibition of the salient content. Explicit negation seems to serve this function. Moreover, 
perhaps because false information was detected so easily, at least in the present paradigm, it 
created a false sense of security that one is protected from this misinformation. The latter, we 
believe, is common in real-world cases of bias attributed to identified misinformation. 
It is noteworthy that our participants were not instructed to detect or report the truth-
value of the sentences. Hence, the present findings might have strong implications for 
situations in which people detect that messages are false but are not prompted to give explicit 
truth-value judgments (as may happen in many everyday situations when false information is 
encountered). The results of all our impression tasks demonstrate the sensitivity of the mental 
system to truth and falsehood. That is, our respondents reacted positively to true sentences 
(that happen to be negations of a falsehood) and disliked sentences that conveyed false 
information (see Unkelbach et al., 2011). Speculatively, the detection of false information 
might make people worry about being duped (Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007) or might 
elicit other negative feelings associated with the discovery of falsehood. The opposite might 
be the case when one reads a negation of falsehood. Future research should address the 
question of whether explicit truth-value judgments lead to a stronger encoding of valid 
concepts and weaker encoding of false concepts when confronted with clearly false 
information in comparison to explicit negations of falsehood. 
Reliance on Misinformation 
A typical finding in a paradigm that demonstrates reliance on misinformation (e.g., 
Fazio et al., 2013) is that even people who reveal factual knowledge in an early test (e.g., 
“The largest ocean is the Pacific”) err in answering questions about this knowledge (e.g., 
“What is the largest ocean?”) after being exposed to misinformation (e.g., “The largest ocean 
is the Atlantic”). The theoretical analysis of our findings attributes this effect to a difference 
between encoding of the valid and false concepts while processing misinformation. 
Accordingly, reliance on misinformation can occur either because false information was 
presented in a context that does not support encoding of the valid concept, or because it was 
presented in a context that supports encoding of the false concept (see Rapp et al., 2014). For 
example, the context of reading a narrative in which one may be immersed with no goal of 
truth judgment may lead to both, resulting in an adoption of the false concept even when one 
has the knowledge to reject it (e.g., Appel & Richter, 2007; Gerrig & Prentice, 1991; Green, 
2004; Green & Brock, 2000). 
Note that (mis)information may vary with respect to the availability of valid concepts. 
The sentences in our study utilize false information for which virtually every recipient could 
come up with the valid concept corresponding to the intended meaning. Of course, in some 
cases, only one concept is available. For example, the sentence “The MMR vaccine does not 
lead to autism” (Horne, Powell, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2012) 
attempts to battle a shared misapprehension, namely, that MMR vaccination is responsible for 
autism in children. However, the general public often lacks the relevant knowledge to clearly 
grasp a corresponding valid concept. In such cases people are particularly sensitive to 
misinformation, and attempts to remedy this by using negations are unlikely to succeed (see 
also Chan et al., 2017). Therefore, it is recommended that remedial attempts should not only 
employ explicit negations but be accompanied by possible valid representations, such as the 
risk or the prevalence of diseases the MMR vaccine actually reduces (Horne et al., 2015; see 
also Ecker, O’Reilly, Reid, & Chang, in press). 
The failure to access the correct answer is especially important when people learn 
information that is later found to be invalid. The belief-perseverance effect (see review in 
Schul & Burnstein, 1998) and the continued-influence effect (Brydges, Gignac, & Ecker, 
2018; Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017) both suggest that after known information has 
been discredited, recipients do not necessarily access the correct information, especially when 
their cognitive abilities are taxed. To obtain appropriate correction it is imperative to provide 
recipients with the alternative (i.e., correct) knowledge so that the original (false) knowledge 
can be replaced. In our terminology, it is important to shift them from a stronger encoding of 
the false concept to a stronger encoding of the valid concept. Ecker et al. (2015) showed that 
recency plays an important role in the continued influence of misinformation, with more 
recently presented false concepts showing the strongest influence of misinformation and more 
recently presented valid concepts showing the strongest correction effects. Thus, correction 
effects might be most efficient when valid concepts are encoded during or even after the 
processing of false information rather than before false information is processed (e.g., 
Mazursky & Schul, 1988; see also Rapp, 2008). A similar claim was put forward by Rapp, 
Hinze, Kohlhepp, and Ryskin (2014). The authors showed that when participants were 
instructed to correct false information during reading, the influence of false information was 
substantially reduced. 
The proneness to encode the valid information given a communication of 
misinformation may also depend on the person’s state of mind. Past work on distrust (Mayo, 
2015; Schul et al., 2004) highlighted that persons who distrust tend to activate cognitions that 
are incongruent with the given information. Speculatively, the detection of falsehood would 
be superior by people who distrust; and once misinformation is detected, a mindset of distrust 
might lead to more resistance against the influence of falsehoods. Future research should 
address other possible contexts that might foster the activation and encoding of valid 
concepts. For instance, pragmatic informativeness and recipients’ expectations might be 
relevant factors not only for the processing of negation (Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland & 
Kuperberg, 2008), they might also determine the encoding of false and valid concepts when 
confronted with false information. One possible case could be irony (Giora et al., 2005). 
Investigation of these possibilities should lead to a more comprehensive picture of the 
influence of context on the processing of false information. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Our study relies on offline memory measures to investigate the encoding of valid and 
false concepts. At first glance, online measures might be preferable (see Deutsch et al., 2009; 
Richter et al., 2009). These measures directly assess levels of activation. However, while 
online measures might be more sensitive in capturing momentary activation of concepts (e.g., 
Dudschig & Kaup, 2018), we were genuinely interested in the longer-term effects of the 
differences in encoding, as such effects might be closer to effects of interest, like the reliance 
on misinformation. Nevertheless, future research should employ both online and offline 
measures to investigate how the relative activation of true and false concepts influences 
encoding strength. 
Our findings imply that even when false information is detected, it is not mentally 
corrected to the same degree as false information that is explicitly rejected by negation. 
Admittedly, the obtained effects in this research are small, referring to behavioral tendencies 
rather than all-or-none processes. However, these tendencies might be especially influential 
when people act under uncertainty (e.g., trying to remember whether a piece of information 
was encountered). 
Taken together, our theoretical analysis suggests that false information and the explicit 
negation of false information are capable of activating both the valid concept and the false 
concept. However, the encoding strength of the two types of concepts might depend on the 
context and one’s goals at the time the information is processed. At times, people might be 
extremely proficient and correct false information easily. At other times, the correction of 
false information might be difficult or even unsuccessful in the sense that people maintain the 
false concept. It is critical to clarify factors that strengthen the meaning associated with the 
false and the valid concept in order to predict outcomes when people are confronted with 
false information under various conditions. We believe that applying our framework will 
strongly support this endeavor. 
 
Context 
 
We live in an era of misinformation, which is the palpable context for this study. The 
explosion of fake news highlights the challenge for people in distinguishing between truth 
and falsehood, and it shows that they are easily influenced by misinformation. The presented 
research suggests a theoretical framework that helps to clarify under which conditions people 
hold fast to falsehoods and which conditions lead to a correction of falsehoods. The main 
implication of our current findings is that in order to correct false information, it is not 
enough to trust that people “know better” when they are exposed to obviously false 
information. Rather, it is critical to explicitly negate falsehood and thereby make recipients 
consider the valid answer. While even obviously false sentences can bias people away from 
the truth, our present study suggests that a remedy for this bias is an explicit negation of 
falsehood, as this seems to trigger consideration of a valid alternative. 
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APPENDIX 
Overview of experimental sentences 
    
Affirmative false Negated true Baseline 
The sun rises in the west. The sun does not rise in the west. The sun rises after dawn. 
Turtles move fast. Turtles do not move fast. Turtles eat lettuce. 
Giraffes are short. Giraffes are not short. Giraffes inhabit savannas. 
A forest consists of dunes. 
A forest does not consist of 
dunes. A forest is a habitat. 
Scissors are used to paste. Scissors are not used to paste. Scissors are used in school. 
England is a city. England is not a city. England has a soccer team. 
Boats sail on land. Boats do not sail on land. Boats have sails. 
Shorts are worn in winter. Shorts are not worn in winter. Shorts are worn by kids. 
Sugar is bitter. Sugar is not bitter. Sugar is used for desserts. 
Lemons are salty. Lemons are not salty. Lemons are juicy. 
The Arctic is hot. The Arctic is not hot. 
The Arctic is located in the 
Arctic Ocean. 
Fish have pores. Fish do not have pores. Fish have bones. 
Birds have fur. Birds do not have fur. Birds have wings. 
Beer is solid. Beer is not solid. Beer contains alcohol. 
Soap makes you dirty. Soap does not make you dirty. Soap is a hygiene product. 
Towels are used to get wet. Towels are not used to get wet. 
Towels can be found in the 
bathroom. 
Cars have legs. Cars do not have legs. Cars have an ignition lock. 
Omelets are made from 
chicken. 
Omelets are not made from 
chicken. 
Omelets can be made with 
parsley. 
The "Big Apple" is Detroit. The "Big Apple" is not Detroit. The "Big Apple" is a nickname. 
A dove is a symbol of war. A dove is not a symbol of war. A dove is a sign of hope. 
You should cross the road 
when your traffic light is 
red. 
You should not cross the road 
when your traffic light is red. 
You should cross the road when 
the traffic light signals it. 
Lightning flashes are dark. Lightning flashes are not dark. 
Lightning flashes can be seen 
during a storm. 
Elephants are small. Elephants are not small. Elephants have a trunk. 
Airplanes fly in the streets. Airplanes do not fly in the streets. Airplanes fly at high altitudes. 
Most brides wear black. Most brides do not wear black. Most brides wear dresses. 
Rocks are soft. Rocks are not soft. Rocks are minerals. 
Jumbo jets are light. Jumbo jets are not light. 
Jumbo jets are a means of 
transport. 
A pear is a vegetable. A pear is not a vegetable. A pear has seeds inside. 
Baked beans is a beverage. Baked beans is not a beverage. 
Baked beans can be bought in 
cans. 
Diamonds are cheap. Diamonds are not cheap. Diamonds are gemstones. 
Most people sleep during 
the day. 
Most people do not sleep during 
the day. 
Most people sleep in a 
comfortable position. 
Peas are square. Peas are not square. Peas are edible raw and cooked. 
An hour has 60 seconds. 
An hour does not have 60 
seconds. 
An hour is defined as a period 
of time. 
Magazines are made from 
textile. 
Magazines are not made from 
textile. 
Magazines are sold at 
newsstands. 
You lock a door with a 
knife. 
You do not lock a door with a 
knife. 
You lock a door to prevent 
others from entering. 
During a theatre 
performance the audience 
should be noisy. 
During a theatre performance the 
audience should not be noisy. 
During a theatre performance 
the audience is sitting. 
The lowest story of a 
building is the attic. 
The lowest story of a building is 
not the attic. 
The lowest story of a building is 
sometimes underground. 
Cake is baked in the fridge. Cake is not baked in the fridge. 
Cake is baked on special 
occasions. 
Fever, coughing, and a 
running nose are signs that 
you are healthy. 
Fever, coughing, and a running 
nose are signs that you are not 
healthy. 
Fever, coughing, and a running 
nose are symptoms of a flu. 
Winning the lottery is 
common. 
Winning the lottery is not 
common. 
Winning the lottery is a stroke 
of luck. 
Trains run on highways. Trains do not run on highways. Trains stop at railroad stations. 
Honey is made by 
butterflies. Honey is not made by butterflies. Honey is made out of nectar. 
Most people’s dominant 
hand is left. 
Most people’s dominant hand is 
not left. 
Most people’s dominant hand is 
more skillful. 
You need to charge your 
battery when it is full. 
You need to charge your battery 
when it is not full. 
You need to charge your battery 
once in a while. 
Texas lies in the north. Texas does not lie in the north. Texas is in the USA. 
A chair is a piece of 
clothing. A chair is not a piece of clothing. A chair is an object. 
Alligators are mammals. Alligators are not mammals. Alligators are about 13 ft long. 
An eye of a needle is wide. An eye of a needle is not wide. 
An eye of a needle is made for 
pulling thread. 
The currency in the USA is 
dinar. 
The currency in the USA is not 
dinar. 
The currency in the USA 
consists of bills and coins. 
Dogs wag their whiskers. Dogs do not wag their whiskers. Dogs wag when they are joyful. 
People smile when they are 
angry. 
People smile when they are not 
angry. 
People smile when something 
funny happens. 
Breakfast is eaten in the 
evening. 
Breakfast is not eaten in the 
evening. 
Breakfast is eaten all over the 
world. 
Soup is eaten with a fork. Soup is not eaten with a fork. Soup is eaten as a starter. 
You leave the subway 
through the entrance. 
You do not leave the subway 
through the entrance. 
You leave the subway when 
you have reached your 
destination. 
People lie down to sleep in 
the kitchen. 
People do not lie down to sleep in 
the kitchen. 
People lie down to sleep when 
they are exhausted. 
You chew with your 
tongue. 
You do not chew with your 
tongue. You chew with your jaw. 
People drink coffee from a 
pan. 
People do not drink coffee from a 
pan. People drink coffee at work. 
Scarves are worn around 
the wrist. 
Scarves are not worn around the 
wrist. Scarves are worn in the fall. 
Shoes are worn on hands. Shoes are not worn on hands. Shoes are worn by humans. 
Belts are worn around the 
ankle. 
Belts are not worn around the 
ankle. Belts are worn to support pants. 
 
*Presentation and counterbalancing: Sentences appeared in a false affirmative, a true negated, 
or a baseline version, as a between-participants manipulation, and were never repeated 
within-participant. Thus, each participant saw as experimental trials 20 different affirmative 
false, 20 different negated true, and 20 different baseline sentences. Which sentence appeared 
as affirmative false, negated true, or baseline version was counterbalanced between-
participants. To this end, we created six different counterbalancing conditions. The 
counterbalancing ensured that every sentence appeared with the same frequency as 
affirmative false, negated true, or baseline version, and it guaranteed an independence of 
version and nominal sentence. Sentences appeared in a different random order for each 
participant. 
 
 
 
